This note shows that Machina's (1982) assumption that preferences over lotteries are smooth has some economic implications. We show that Fr echet di erentiability implies that preferences represent second order risk aversion (as well as conditional second order risk aversion). This implies, among other things, that decision makers buy full insurance only at the absence of marginal loading. We a l s o show that with constant absolute and relative r i s k a version, expected value maximization, second order risk aversion, and Fr echet di erentiability are equivalent. Journal of Economic Literature Classi cation Number: D81.
1 Introduction Machina 6] introduced the concept of smooth representations of preferences over risky prospects. The real valued functional V over distribution functions is Fr echet di erentiable at F if, for all G i n a n e i g h borhood of F, there is a \local utility" function (over outcomes) u( F) : R ! R such t h a t V (G) ; V (F ) = Z u(x F)d G(x) ; F(x)] + o(k G ; F k) (1) where k k is the L 1 -norm. The functional V is Fr echet di erentiable if it is Fr echet di erentiable at all F (see Zeidler 13] ). The preference relation is called Fr echet di erentiable if it has a Fr echet di erentiable representation. Machina argued that since many problems in economics involve o n l y l o c a l analysis (for example, optimization and comparative statics analysis), and since the functional V can be locally approximated by an expected utility functional, it should follow t h a t m a n y of the economic results of expected utility apply to all (smooth) nonexpected utility preferences. It turns out that some well known preference relations are not Fr echet di erentiable (see Chew, Karni, and Safra 1]), but they too have local utility approximations, although only in L p for p > 1 (see Wang 11] ). It thus seems that although the Fr echet di erentiability assumption rules out some models, it does not have a n y e ect on our ability to analyze local behavior under risk. In this note we s h o w that this, however, is not true, and assuming Fr echet di erentiability has some economic meaning.
Orders of Risk Aversion and Fr echet Differentiability
At p o i n ts (i.e., degenerate distributions) where the increasing utility function u : R ! R is di erentiable (that is, almost everywhere), the expected utility functional R u(x)dF(x) behaves locally like expected value. Extending this property to nonexpected utility preferences, Segal and Spivak 9] de ned the concept of second order risk aversion as follows. Consider the set X of all real bounded random variables on a measure space = (S P First order risk aversion implies kinked indi erence curves along the main diagonal in a states-of-the-world representation, while second order risk aversion implies smooth such indi erence curves (see Segal and Spivak 9] ). The concept of orders of risk aversion has some economic applications. A second order risk averter will buy full insurance if and only if its price is \fair," that is, when the price of a dollar insurance equals the probability of loss. On the other hand, a rst order risk averter will buy full insurance even at the face of some marginal loading. (For this, see Segal and Spivak 9] . See also Karni 4] for other results concerning insurance and orders of risk aversion. For applications to the equity premium puzzle, see Epstein and Zin 2]). Machina 7] o ers an extensive discussion of di erent possible kinks of indi erence curves in the space of payo s. Some of these kinks are consistent with Fr echet di erentiability (e.g., expected utility with a non di erentiable utility function), and some are not (e.g., the rank dependent model). The di erence between his approach and ours is that he is interested in the locally separable versus locally nonseparable nature of such kinks, while we are interested in the relation between Fr echet di erentiability and orders of risk aversion. Segal and Spivak 10] show that under the assumption of Fr echet di erentiability of the representation functional V , the preference relation satis es rst second] order risk aversion at a point x i the local utility u(x x ) i s not di erentiable di erentiable] with respect to its rst argument a t x = x .
Using these results, Theorem 1 below states a connection between Fr echet di erentiability and orders of risk aversion.
Theorem 1 If the preference r elation can be r epresented b y a F r echet di erentiable functional V , then for almost all x , satis es second order risk aversion at x . In other words, the set of points where the preference relation satis es rst order risk aversion is of measure z e r o.
Proof By monotonicity, the functional V satis es V ( x ) > V ( y ) () x > y, hence the set of points where @V( x )=@x does not exist is of measure zero. The conclusion now follows from the equivalence of the following three conditions.
1. The derivative @V( x )=@x exists at x = x . 2. The preference relation satis es second order risk aversion at x = x . 3. The local utility u(x x ) is di erentiable with respect to its rst argument a t x = x .
The equivalence of (2) and (3) is proved in 10]. To see why (1) and (3) are equivalent, note that V ( x +" ) ; V ( x ) = u(x + " x ) ; u(x x ) + o(") (see eq. 1). Divide both sides by " and let " ! 0 to obtain that V ( x ) i s di erentiable with respect to x at x = x i u(x x ) is di erentiable with respect to its rst argument a t x = x .
The theorem implies that all models that have k i n k ed indi erence curves at all points along the main diagonal in a states-of-the-world representation are not (L 1 ) F r echet di erentiable. Such is the rank dependent model (for a direct proof that this model is not Fr echet di erentiable, see Chew, Karni and Safra 1]. For a proof that this model satis es rst order risk aversion, see Segal and Spivak 9] Example 1 Let the set of outcomes be 0 2], let u(x) = ;x 2 +5x;3, and de-
We s h o w that this preference relation satis es second order risk aversion, but is not Fr echet di erentiable.
Second order risk aversion: It is easy to verify that for x < 1, u(x) < x , and for x > 1, u(x) > x . Let x 6 2 f 0 1 2g, s a y 0 < x < 1. Then for everyx 6 = 0 with expected value zero and for every su ciently small t > 0, E u(x + tx)] < E x + tx] = x . Second order behavior thus follows from the properties of the expected utility functional E u(F)]. A similar argument holds for the case 1 < x < 2.
Next we s h o w second order behavior at x = 1 . Since u is a concave function, it follows that for allx with zero expected value and for all t > 0, E u(
Also, for all > 0, u(x ; ) < x ; . Therefore, both x + tx and x ;
are computed with respect to u, which exhibits second order behavior.
Fr echet di erentiability: Suppose can be represented by t h e F r echet di erentiable functional W(F) = h(V (F )), where h is strictly increasing. Pick such a distribution F and observe t h a t s i n c e W is Fr echet di erentiable at F and h 0 (V (F)) > 0, then V too is Fr echet di erentiable at F. In this section we s h o w that Fr echet di erentiability implies conditional second order risk aversion almost everywhere, but even this stronger concept does not imply Fr echet di erentiability. (The reason Example 1 is nevertheless needed is explained below).
Theorem 2 If the preference r elation can be r epresented b y a F r echet di erentiable functional V , then for all X = ( x 1 p 1 : : : x n p n ), for all i, and for almost all x i , satis es conditional second order risk aversion for (X ;i x i ) : = ( x 1 p 1 : : : x i p i : : : x n p n ) at x i .
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1. The preference relation of Example 1 exhibits second order risk aversion. Moreover, using the same arguments, it exhibits conditional second order risk aversion everywhere. (As before, the only interesting case is when E F] = E u(F)]. Adding tx with E x] = 0 t o x i will reduce E u(F)], but will not change E F]. Also, since for all x, u 0 (x) > 1, the computation of the conditional risk premium will be done with respect to u. Conditional second order thus follows from the fact that di erentiable expected utility exhibits conditional second order risk aversion (see 5])). As we h a ve s h o wn above, for any representation of the preference relation of Example 1 there are points where this representation is not Fr echet (and Gâteaux) di erentiable, but this set is small (the functional V of this example is di erentiable everywhere except for the set of distributions where E F] = E u(F)]. For any representation W = h(V ), h is almost everywhere di erentiable, hence W is not Fr echet di erentiable only at the distributions where V is nondi erentiable, or at the small sets of indi erence sets where h is nondi erentiable). The functional V of the next example is nowhere Fr echet di erentiable, moreover, given any representation W = h(V ) of the preference relation, there is a dense set of indi erence sets such that for all points in these sets, W is not Fr echet di erentiable there (although it is Gâteaux di erentiable). As we show, although this preference relation exhibits rst order risk aversion everywhere, it exhibits conditional second order risk aversion almost everywhere. This example exhibits rst order risk aversion at all x. Indeed, letx = (x 1 p 1 : : : x n p n ) s u c h that x 1 6 6 x n and E(x) = 0. Assume, wlg, that
there exists k such t h a t
. Clearly, V ( x ) = x, a n d V ( x + tx) = x + 2t 3 P k i=1 p i x i . Therefore, (x tx) = ;
On the other hand, it is easy to verify that the preference relation represented by V satis es conditional second order risk aversion at x i unless P j:x j <x i p j < 1 2 , but P j:x j 6x i p j > 1 2 . In other words, conditional second order risk aversion is satis ed everywhere, except for the outcome where the cumulative distribution function intersects the level F(x) = 1 2 . Despite the fact that this preference relation is essentially (conditional) second order, the functional V is nowhere Fr echet di erentiable and for any transformation W = h(V ) of it, there is a dense set of indi erence sets of such t h a t W is not Fr echet di erentiable at all distributions in these sets.
Of course, we know already from Chew, Karni, and Safra 1] that the rankdependent functional V (of which Y aari's dual theory is a special case) is not Fr echet di erentiable at distributions F that are discontinuous, but here we show that it is not di erentiable at all distributions. The proof is tedious, and appears in the Appendix.
Constant R i s k A v ersion
A partial answer to the question whether second order risk aversion implies Fr echet di erentiability is o ered by the next proposition. If a preference relation satis es constant r i s k a version (de nition below) then having second order risk aversion almost everywhere (in fact, even at one point only), implies that is the expected value preference relation, and hence Fr echet di erentiable.
For X 2 X , let X be the lowest possible value of X (that is, X is the supremum of the values of x for which F X (x) = 0). Observe t h a t f o r X 2 X and a > ;X, X + a 2 X . 2. There i s a w e alth level x at which the decision maker's preference relation displays second order risk aversion. 3. At a l l w e alth levels, the decision maker's preference r elation displays second order risk aversion.
Proof Obviously, ( 1 ) = ) (3) =) (2) . By constant r i s k a version, it is easy to verify that (2) =) (3). To s e e w h y ( 3 ) = ) (1) , pick X = ( x 1 p 1 : : : x n p n ) such t h a t P p i x i = x , b u t X 6 x . If x is su ciently close to x , t h e n there is 6 = 0 such t h a t X + = ( x 1 + ::: x n + ) x . De nẽ x = ( x 1 ; x p 1 : : : x n ; x p n ) and obtain by constant risk aversion that the risk premium the decision maker is willing to pay t o a void tx is t . This contradicts the assumption that the preference relation satis es second order risk aversion. 
